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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
tion, it is submitted that the result in this jurisdiction ought to follow that
of the principal case."
DAVID D. GORDON.
WILLS - REVOCATION AND REVIVAL - SUBSEQUENT WILL. - Testatrix made
two wills, one subsequent to the other, and left them in custody of a bank.
In the second will she expressly revoked the first will. Prior to her death she
withdrew the second will from the bank with intent to change it, leaving the
first will at the bank. After her death the second will could not be found
and consequently was presumed destroyed. The Supreme Court of Virginia
held, two justices dissenting, that the first will was not revoked by the subse-
quent will. The dissent felt that the revocation became effective the moment
the second will was executed. Timberlake v. State-Planters Bank of Com-
merce and Trusts, 115 S.E.2d 39 (Va. 1960).
In absence of statutes, there is great divergence of opinion among the
American cases as to when a revocation by a subsequent will becomes effec-
tive.1 Basically there are three views in this country governing this question:
(1) the common law or revival theory, (2) the ecclesiastical or intent idea,
and (3) the English or anti-revival view which was adopted by statute in
England and in nearly one-half of the states.
2
The common law view is based on the theory that a will is ambulatory
until death and that any subsequent revocation is not effective until the death
of the testator. 3 It has been said that this view is the weight of authority,'
however there are cases to the contrary.5 The defect in this view is that the
will revoked may be revived contrary to the intention of the testator. 6
The ecclesiastical rule says the question of whether or not a revocation of
a later will revives the former is a matter of intent and that there is no
presumption adverse to or in favor of revival. 7 This theory is derived from
the basic principles in all will's cases, that of ascertaining the intention of
the testator. 8 As expressed by Roscoe Pound in 19039 "it [ecclesiastical rule]
has the support of the weight of recent authority in America."
The English rule is exemplified by decisions stating that because of statute,
subsequent revocation becomes effective immediately upon execution, and to
11. Although N.D. Cent. Code § 47-09-14 provides that "When a future interest is
limited by a grant to take effect on the death of any person without heirs, or heirs of
his body, without issue, or in equivalent words, such words must be taken to mean suc-
cessors or issue living at the death of the person named as ancestor . . ." this would
not seem to be conclusive of the issue. Restatement, Property § 292 (1941) uses a broad
definition of "issue" and "descendants" but adds the observation that descendants may be
excluded from sharing in a distribution under the rule slated in § 303. See, also comment
e to this section.
1. ATKINSON, WILLS § 92 (2d ed. 1953).
2. See 28 Calif. L. Rev. 265 (1940).
3. Whitehill v. Halbing, 98 Conn. 21, 118 At. 454 (1922); Bates v. Hacking, 28 R.I.
523, 68 Atl. 622 (1908).
4. In re Gould's Will, 72 Vt. 316, 47 Atl. 1082 (1900).
5. Blackett v. Ziegler, 153 Iowa 344, 133 N.W. 901 (1911); Williams v. Miles, 68
Neb. 463, 94 N.W. 705 (1903).
6. Bates v. Hacking, 28 R.I. 523, 68 Al. 622, 625 (1908).
7. Williams v. Miles, 68 Neb. 463, 94 N.W. 705 t1903); Wrinkle v. Williams, 37
Tenn. App. 27, 260 S.W.2d 304 (1953).
8. Ewell v. Rucker, 28 Tenn. App. 156, 187 S.W.2d 644 (1945).
9. Williams v. Miles, 68 Neb. 463, 94 N.W. 705 708 (1903).
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revive the prior will a new will or codicil must be executed1o This view is
sustained by reason and weight of authority, although disapproved by a minor-
ity of the courts.'1 North Dakota follows the English rule through statute.
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In conclusion it is interesting to note that where not governed by statute
each view claims to have the weight of authority. It seems that the revival
and anti-revival theories are too rigid and may easily destroy the intent of the
testator, however the intent theory has remedied this situation and consequent-
ly would result in a more just decision.
VINCENT SONJU.
WILLS - TESTAM11ENTARY CAPACITY - INSANE DELUSION. - After forty years
of happy married life decedent became obsessed with the idea that his wife
was unfaithful. In fact he had some basis for such thinking although it was
illogical, unreasonable, and unjust. The testator was rational and apparently
of sound mind in all other respects. The court said that one who believes in
suppositions which have no existence except in his imagination is suffering
from a morbid delustion so far as these beliefs are concerned. And though he
conducts himself logically upon the assumption of the delusion, on that par-
ticular subject it is an insane delusion. The New York Court of Appeals held,
three justices dissenting, that the question of testamentary capacity was for
the jury. In-re Honigman's Will, 8 N.Y.2d 244, 168 N.E.2d 676 (Ct. App.
1960).
An insane delusion which affects the provisions of a will is held to be
sufficient to devoid a will for la.k of testamentary capacity.' Since the testa-
tor's mental capacity is assumed' the burden of coming forward with the
evidence to prove the lack of testamentary capacity is upon the contestants.3
However, a delusion to be declared an insane delusion4 must be an irremovable
belief that is not true or does not exist, based on no evidence whatever; con-
sequently causing the testator to dispose of his property in a manner different
from what he would have followed in the absence of such a belief.5
Testator's delusions of wife's unfaithfulness, children's illegitimacy, feelings
of having life threatened, or other feelings, however eccentric or absurd, do
net invalidate a will if there is some basis for such thoughts.6
10. Driver v. Sheffield, 211 Ga. 316, 85 S.E.2d 766 (1955); Singleton v. Singleton,
269 Ky. 330, 107 S.W.2d 273 (1937); In re Walsh's Will, 5 Misc.2d 801, 161 N.Y.S.2d
227 (Sur. Ct. 1957). In re Eberhardt's Estate, 1 Wis.24 439, 85 N.W.2d 483 (1957).
11. See Blackett v. Ziegler, 153 Iowa 344, 133 N.W. 901, 904 (1911).
12. N.D. Rev. Code § 56-0408 (1943).
1. In re Leonard's Estate, 92 Cal.App. 420, 207 P.2d 66 (1949); Sterling v. Dubin,
6 ll.2d 64, 126 N.E.2d 718 (1955); Thayer v. Thayer, 188 Mich. 261, 154 N.W. 32
(1915).
2. Houston v. Grigsby, 217 Ala. 506, 116 So. 68 (1928); Roller v. Kurtz, 6 ll.2d
618, 129 N.E.2d 693 (1955); Black v. Smith, 58 N.D. 109, 224 N.W. 915 (1929).
3. In re Johnson's Will, 201 Iowa 687, 207 N.V. 748 (1926); Black v. Smith, 58
N.D. 109, 224 N.W. 915 (1929); Hedderisch v. Hcdderisch, 18 N.D. 488, 123 N.W.
276 (1909).
4. Herzog, Medical Jurisprudence, "Not every d~lusion is an insane delusion. If the
belief is supported by any facts, however little their evidential force, then it is not an
insane delusion although it may appear illogical and foundationless." Bohler v. Hicks,
120 Ca. 800, 48 S.E. 306 (1904), "The delusion must spring up spontaneously in the
mind of the person, and not be the result of evidence ef any kind."
5. John v. Tallett, 341, Ill.App. 240, 93 N.E.2d 82 (1950); Jackman v. North, 398
Ill. 95, 75 N.E.2d 324 (1947); Potter v. Jones, 20 Ore. 239, 25 Pac. 769 (1891).
6. In re Alegria's Estate, 87 Cal.App.2d 645, 197 P.2d 571 (1948); In re Hayer's
Estate, 230 Iowa 880, 299 N.W. 431 (1941); In re Cole, 5 N.W. 348 (Wis. 1880).
